Bridgesheet

Financial modelling6 min read

Acquisition Synergies: How to Value Them and Set the Price

Acquisition synergies are the gains that exist only if the two companies are combined. To decide how much to pay for them, you value each line, phase it over time, deduct integration costs and losses, then discount the whole lot.

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What acquisition synergies cover

Acquisition synergies are the gains a buyer makes by combining two companies, gains that neither would make alone. They explain most of the gap between the value of the target on a stand-alone basis and the price a trade buyer is prepared to pay. An investment fund with no portfolio company in the same sector has almost none, which is why it generally pays less.

There are three families:

  • Cost synergies: combined purchasing, merged sites or warehouses, duplicated support functions (accounting, IT, management). They depend mainly on decisions taken by the acquirer, so they are the most reliable.
  • Revenue synergies: one company's products sold to the other's customers, access to a new country, a more complete offer. They depend on customers, and materialise less often than planned.
  • Dis-synergies: losses caused by the combination, for example a customer who leaves because it refuses to depend on a competitor, or key employees who quit.

To these three lines you add integration costs: redundancy payments, relocation, IT systems migration, fees. They are paid once, up front, before the gains arrive.

Step 1: value each synergy at run rate

Take a fictional example. The Varenne group, a maker of fasteners, wants to buy Fixalu, a smaller competitor: revenue €60m, EBITDA €7.5m (operating profit before depreciation and amortisation, or 12.5% of revenue). On its own, Fixalu is worth an enterprise value of €60m, or 8 times EBITDA, a multiple drawn from the sector's precedent transactions. The seller's adviser is asking for 9.5 times EBITDA, or €71.25m.

Varenne's team values each gain at its "run rate", meaning once integration is complete, as an effect on pre-tax EBITDA:

Line Calculation Annual effect on EBITDA
Combined purchasing 2% of €40m of shared spend +€0.8m
Closing a warehouse Rent, staff and transport avoided +€1.0m
Duplicated support functions Posts not replaced +€0.6m
Cost synergies +€2.4m
Cross-selling €5m of sales × 30% margin, retained at 50% +€0.75m
Lost customer €2m of sales × 30% margin −€0.6m
Net synergies +€2.55m

Two methodological choices are worth noting. Cross-selling is counted at the contribution margin (here 30%), not at revenue: selling €5m more does not earn €5m. And it is retained at 50%, because nothing guarantees that customers will follow. That haircut is a judgement call: write it into the model rather than hiding it in a rounded figure.

Step 2: phase the gains and place the integration costs

Synergies do not arrive on the day of signing. Varenne expects 40% of cost synergies in year 1, 80% in year 2 and 100% from year 3. Cross-selling starts in year 2, at half pace. The lost customer leaves as soon as the deal is announced. Integration costs reach €3.0m in year 1 and €1.0m in year 2. Corporate income tax is 25%.

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 onwards
Cost synergies €0.96m €1.92m €2.4m
Cross-selling 0 €0.375m €0.75m
Lost customer −€0.6m −€0.6m −€0.6m
Integration costs −€3.0m −€1.0m 0
Total before tax −€2.64m €0.695m €2.55m
After tax (× 0.75) −€1.98m €0.52m €1.91m

Year 1 is negative: the deal costs money before it earns any. That is normal, and it is the year the acquirer's shareholders look at first. Our article on accretion and dilution of earnings per share shows how this dip appears in pro forma EPS.

Step 3: discount to get the value of the synergies

These flows are discounted as in a DCF, at a rate that reflects their risk. Varenne uses 10%, its cost of capital. Years 1 and 2 are discounted one by one. From year 3, the gain of €1.91m repeats: it is capitalised with no growth (1.9125 ÷ 10% = €19.1m), then brought back to today by dividing by 1.1².

Flow Calculation Present value
Year 1 −1.98 ÷ 1.10 −€1.8m
Year 2 0.52 ÷ 1.10² €0.4m
Year 3 onwards 19.1 ÷ 1.10² €15.8m
Value of the synergies €14.4m

The breakdown by type shows where the value sits, and therefore where the risk lies:

Type Present value
Cost synergies €16.7m
Cross-selling €4.9m
Lost customer −€4.5m
Integration costs −€2.7m
Total €14.4m

Cost synergies carry all of the value. The lost customer on its own wipes out almost all of the cross-selling: a modest dis-synergy each year weighs heavily once capitalised.

A quick method circulates in investment committees: multiply the net run-rate synergies by the target's multiple and deduct the integration costs (2.55 × 8 − 4.0 = €16.4m). It overstates the value, here by €2m, because it ignores the ramp-up and tax. Keep it for an order of magnitude, never for an offer.

How much of the synergies to pay the seller

The value of the synergies sets the price beyond which the acquirer destroys value for its own shareholders:

Maximum price = stand-alone value of the target + value of the synergies = 60 + 14.4 = €74.4m

At €71.25m, Varenne would pay €11.25m above Fixalu's stand-alone value, or 78% of the synergies. The seller would collect most of a gain that only the buyer can produce, and for which the buyer carries all the execution risk.

A disciplined acquirer keeps at least half of the synergies. If it gives up 50%, its offer is capped at 60 + 7.2 = €67.2m, or about 9.0 times EBITDA. The logic is the same as for the control premium on a listed company: the premium is just an advance on the synergies.

The final split depends on bargaining power. If there are several trade buyers, each with its own synergies, the seller will capture a larger share. If there is only one credible buyer, it can stay close to the stand-alone value of the target.

Test the downside case before signing

The €14.4m figure assumes everything goes to plan. Varenne reruns the calculation with a downside case: only 70% of cost synergies, no cross-selling, integration costs 30% higher (€3.9m then €1.3m), and the lost customer still gone.

Base case Downside case
Net run-rate synergies €2.55m €1.08m
Value of the synergies €14.4m €3.7m
Maximum price €74.4m €63.7m

In the downside case, the asking price of €71.25m exceeds the maximum price by €7.5m. An offer at €67.2m is still above it, but the gap falls to €3.5m. To present these ranges, a sensitivity table crossing the rate of synergy delivery with integration costs reads better than a single figure.

Pitfalls to avoid

  • Counting synergies twice. If the target's multiple comes from deals in which buyers had already paid for part of their synergies, the "stand-alone value" already contains some. Add only the synergies specific to your acquirer.
  • Forgetting what cross-selling costs. Selling more requires inventory, customer payment terms and sometimes sales staff: working capital rises. In a full model, deduct it from the cash flow.
  • Announcing without an owner. Each synergy line must have an owner and a date in the integration plan. A synergy with no name stays theoretical.
  • Ignoring dis-synergies. List the customers who also work with a competitor of the acquirer, and the employees who might leave. These are the first risks after the announcement.
  • Discounting revenue at the same rate as costs. Cross-selling is more uncertain. If you do not apply a volume haircut as here, raise its discount rate.

Our M&A merger Excel model includes synergies with their ramp-up, integration costs, pro forma EPS and goodwill. It is a calculation tool: the result remains an estimate that depends on your assumptions, and is neither a certified valuation nor investment advice.